Abstract. The legitimation of technology poIicy is discussed from the point of view of the neoclassical and of the dynamic, Schumpeterian, approach. The results are presented, using the traditional categories of policy legitimation in welfare theory: public goods, externalities, and merit goods. Art policy legitimation is discussed within the same conceptual framework. The application of the dynamic approach to art policy leads to conclusions similar to the general conclusions about technology policy. A review of the postwar development of (Dutch) art policy supports the impression that art policy may be on its way to become a subspecies of technology policy.
Introduction
At first glance, technology policy and art policy seem to have little in common. This seems to be especially the case with respect to problems of "legitimation". It is commonly thought that money spent on art is difficult to justify on strict economic grounds. Some people conclude therefore that the arts should not be supported at all while other people simply deny that there is any need for "narrow" economic legitimation because art is a self-evident good thing which all good people should support. On the other hand, technological change has been shown to be a major explanation of productivity growth. Public policies to promote technological change are therefore generally thought to be more easily defensible on economic grounds.
Most economic analyses of technology policy or art policy are based on neoclassical economic theory. However, especially in industrial economics, neoclassical theory has come to be replaced, or at least to be supplemented by, a new theoretical approach. This new approach has been called "dynamic", "Schumpeterian", or "evolutionary". Neoclassical theory and dynamic theory agree that public intervention can only be legitimate in case of market failure. A defense of governmental intervention in the arts must entail a demonstration of market failure in the arts market. However, the two approaches differ with respect to the question of what exactly constitutes a properly functioning market. According to neoclassical theory, a "perfect" market is a market which is in a state of pareto-optimal equilibrium. Necessary conditions to achieve this state include that no agent on the market has market power (all agents must be price takers) and that all agents dispose of perfect information. The defenders of the dynamic approach consider these conditions to be so unrealistic that a model using them as assumptions is fundamentally flawed.
According to dynami c theory, a perfectly functioning market is a market in a state of continuous disequilibrium, allowing a maximum amount of innovation and change. Because the two approaches demand different things of a functioning market, they also result in different conclusions with respect to the legitimacy of specific public interventions.
The main subject of this paper is the legitimation of public support of the arts. The discussion of technology policy serves two aims. First, to compare the economic arguments that have been proposed to justify support of technological innovation on the one hand and support of the arts on the other. Secondly, to consider whether the latest developments in technology policy are, or should be, mirrored by developments in art policy. This paper will attempt to present the arguments in favor of technology policy, first from a neoclassical point of view and then in the context of the dynamic approach. Following this, the arguments in favor of art policy will be discussed. Finally, conclusions will be reached about the relation between art policy and technology policy. I will treat both technology policy and art policy mainly in a national context. Issues having to do with international trade would complicate the discussion without changing the main argument.
Technology Policy
The importance of technology to economic success has been increasingly recognized, at the level of the economy, of the industry, and of the individual firm.
Solow's (1957) seminal article and many later contributions in the same vein have shown how only a small part of productivity growth could be attributed to increasing capital intensity. The rest, the so-called "residual", has to be attributed to other causes among which "technological change" figures predominantly. Even earlier, Schumpeter emphasized the importance of innovation in explaining the growth of firms and industries. The microeconomic and the macroeconomic roles of technology were most clearly linked in the work of those writers who explained long-term macro developments in terms of clusters of Schumpeterian innovations in time (Mensch, 1979; Freeman et al., 1982; Kleinknecht, 1986) and in particular "leading" industries (Rostow, 1960 (Rostow, , 1978 van Duijn, 1983) .
The attention given to the role of technology led to two seemingly contradictory responses. On the one hand, if technological change was so important, governments should consider it their task to actively promote innovation. Recent decades have seen all developed countries, and most of the less developed countries, explicitly adopting technology policies and explosively increasing the money spent. On the other hand, if innovation was such a good idea for enterprises, would not the market
